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4ABSTRACT
The mainstay of the public transport system in Kerala is the private
stage carriages (PSC), the economics of operation of which is the subject
of this paper. The long run sustainability of the sector depends on the
full recovery of costs. In the presence of fixed costs, there are various
approaches to the full recovery of costs and Kerala has taken the approach
of regular fare revision ostensibly to cover costs based on committee
recommendations. Since 1999, fares are being revised on the basis of
the National Transportation Planning and Research Centre's price index
for stage carriage operations (PISCO) applicable in Kerala, which, it is
argued here, is one of the causes of the poor sustainability of the industry.
PISCO uses average kilometers run and average concessional load factor
in the computation of fares, which leads to a situation of those running
above average kilometers, and carrying below average concessional
load factor making above average profits and others not covering their
costs. The use of weighted load factor raises general fares with the
travelling public, and not the society at large, subsidizing the
concessional passengers. One of the solutions to this problem lies, firstly
in moving over to two - part tariff and secondly to tax financing of
student subsidy.
Key words:  public transport, cost recovery, two-part tariff, tax financing, student
subsidy
JEL Classification: L92, R 48
51. Introduction
Kerala is somewhat different from the other South Indian states in
that the mainstay of the public transport system in the state is the private
stage carriages (PSC). Whereas PSC is a very small percentage of the
total number of stage carriages in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil
Nadu, it accounts for about three fourths of the total number in Kerala.
Considering the state of financial health of the Kerala State Road
Transport Corporation (KSRTC) and its poor long time record of meeting
the needs of the population, the compulsion to make the PSCs
sustainable cannot be underestimated. This is all the more relevant as
the trend the world over is to move away from public operators to private
operators: Sweden, Britain, Denmark, and Norway have all moved this
way preferring competitive tendering to bring down unit costs of
operation (Hensher and Wallis, 2005).  The maladies of the PSC sub
sector could be arising due to the environment within which they have
been operating, or the poor economics of their operation. A discussion
of the economics of operation of PSCs is the subject of this paper. In
particular, the effect of the pricing formula on the economics of operation
is the main concern of the paper. Any discussion of the pricing of public
transport cannot afford to ignore the issue of student fare and the
associated subsidy. The paper ends with some suggestions to solve the
problem of full recovery of fixed cost of PSCs drawing on the economic
thinking that has gone into it over the last 100 and odd years.
6The paper is organized in seven sections. Following this
introduction, section 2 presents a brief account of the economics of full
cost recovery when fixed costs are present. Section 3 is an exposition of
price index for stage carriage operations (PISCO). Section 4 illustrates
the variability in cost recovery for PSCs by kilometers run daily. Section
5 is a discussion of the options in fare fixation open to Kerala given the
specificity of PSCs owned in ones or twos by individual entrepreneurs.
Section 6 discusses the issue of equity arising out of cross subsidizing
student fares and section 7 concludes.
2. The Economics of Pricing and Cost Recovery in Transport
Industry
The inherent advantage of competition is that it provides
consumers with choice and forces suppliers to provide their services as
efficiently as possible. A potential problem is that in conditions of
imperfections of the market, providers may not be able to supply the
service at a competitive price which fully recovers the cost. If costs are
not recovered, then in the long run sustainability of the industry would
be at stake.
Economic theory tells us that when there are no fixed costs prices
are kept at a minimum consistent with the suppliers recovering all costs
in the long run. If there are no fixed costs, then marginal costs will be the
entire costs of each unit of production. Once fixed costs are introduced
into the situation, marginal costs are insufficient for capital cost recovery.
This issue was intuitively considered in the mid-19th century and a
solution was found in monopoly power needed to stimulate adequate
investment.
The monopoly power itself, however, was seen as needed to
stimulate adequate investment, and without this guarantee of
protection from competition it was felt that entrepreneurs would
shy away from the sector. The result was either legislation that
effectively gave monopoly power to a railroad company over a
7certain jurisdiction but with rates of-return regulated so that
excess rents could not be earned, or the taking over of railroads
by the state (Button, 2005: p.243).
Many state governments in India have set up transport
undertakings which are monopolies to address the problem. Karnataka,
Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh have followed such a path leaving few
routes for private service providers. Kerala has, however, taken a route
with monopolistic intent1  but the Kerala State Road Transport
Corporation owned by the government accounts for only about 25% of
all the stage carriage buses in the state. PSCs account for the rest and are
the mainstay of the public transport system.
The challenge confronting any transport supplier is how to ensure
sufficient revenue is forthcoming to cover these costs (fixed) in addition
to more traditional variable factors such as fuel. Various approaches
have been adopted to cover costs:
Subsidies is one of the approaches used for long to recover the
costs of capital. The argument is that once an investment has been made
it is most economically efficient to maximize its use subject to the
willingness of users to pay the 'incremental' costs of their actions. This
has been the widely used policy for railways in Europe, and the United
Kingdom in recent years with subsidized track being separated from
commercially driven operations (Button, 2005: p.247). A problem with
the system of subsidies is that it might lead to perverse incentives such
as to resist pay rises for labour or to economise capital outlays. There is
also a danger of rent seekers capturing the system, such as input suppliers
inflating prices. A variety of mechanisms have evolved to contain these
failures the details of which are not relevant here.
Monopolies can recover their full costs by either setting their
prices or outputs. But there is a tendency for governments to intervene
 1. The intent is evident from the nationalization of 31 major routes, for which
PSCscannot get permits and can only enter and exit.
8either through regulation or public ownership. There are also instances
where government creates monopoly power; institutional monopoly
comes through licensing or tendering out services. Licensing a set
number of taxicabs in a city, or the tendering out of bus service are
examples of institutional monopoly. A difficulty with monopolies is
that of containing market power. Traditional rate-of-return (RoR)
regulation which allowed prices to recover all costs together with a
reasonable RoR was frequently captured by the industry or regulatory
body that had a vested interest in avoiding confrontation. Various
stakeholders exploited this situation.
Advanced revenue with capital adjustments is what many tour
operators, contractual bus operators and freight railway companies in
Canada and the United States of America resort to. Here the approach is
to secure a more certain revenue flow and then to adjust capital outlays
to earn a viable return.
Two, or multi-part tariff  or separating out fixed from marginal
costs and charging for each separately has been a standard way for many
utilities to recover their full costs. In the case of telecommunications
consumers normally pay an access fee and a usage fee. This is also
common in many club memberships. Its successful use depends on both
the relative importance of the capital element in costs and the frequency
of use. When the service being offered is homogeneous and the use is
regular and heavy it is most efficient (Button, 2005: p.255).
Thus, some mechanism has to be found to make the industry recover
the cost and regulation is one of these mechanisms. As regards the
transport industry in Kerala, regulation uses two instruments to achieve
the objective of cost recovery or reasonable profit. Firstly, to run a
transport service in a specific route a permit has to be obtained from the
competent authority, namely the Motor Vehicle Department. By not
allowing too many services to run during a specified time of the day, the
limited passenger traffic is not distributed among too many operators
9allowing for a minimum passenger load factor. Secondly, the passenger
fares are not left for the market forces to determine; rather the state
government regularly appoints committees to study the cost conditions
and recommend passenger fares. These recommendations are generally
accepted by the government and the service providers charge these
fares.
In the context of full cost recovery a discussion of the concessional
fare for students and the associated subsidy cannot be avoided. The
rationale for the introduction of subsidy for student travel is to provide
easy physical access to educational institutions for all classes of students.
When the number of educational institutions was few and students had
to travel some distance to access an educational institution charging
fares lower than the general fare was one way to incentivize school
education. The burden of subsidized fare cannot fall on the PSCs lest full
cost recovery is affected. The alternatives then are either cross subsidization
or tax financing of the subsidy. Both have their own welfare implications.
In a situation when transport services are run by large monopoly fleet
owners the subsidy can be directly paid to them as is done in Karnataka,
Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh. Such an option becomes
administratively difficult when services are provided by PSCs owned in
ones and twos by a large number of entrepreneurs. Some form of cross
subsidization has to be resorted to. Kerala has adopted such a strategy.
We are not concerned with the issue of permits here. Turning to
the fixation of the fares, it might not lead to the survival and growth of
the industry if the principles of costing adopted are at variance with the
accepted economic principles of costing. One important element here is
the treatment of fixed costs of operating the service. The problem of
transport pricing and cost recovery has to be solved within particular
institutional and technological constraints. These constraints are often
a combination of public subsidies, institutional monopolies and various
forms of regulations. And there is no single way of recovering full costs.
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3. Price Index for Stage Carriage Operations (PISCO)- An
Exposition
In 1998, National Transportation Planning and Research Centre
brought out a price index for stage carriage operations (PISCO)
applicable in Kerala. The index considered eight factors which
influenced the cost of operation of stage carriages. These components
were: (i) fuel, (ii) lubricants, (iii) tyre and tube, (iv) spare parts and
maintenance labour, (v) taxes and insurance, (vi) crew wages, (vii) cost
of capital, and (viii) depreciation. Under each cost component, cost
items are listed as shown in Table 1. For each cost item, unit quantity per
kilometer is computed by taking an average yield (for fuel), average use
(for tyre, tube and spares) and average kilometers run (for wages and tax
etc.). For instance, 0.2222 is arrived at for fuel by dividing unity by 4.5
Kms assuming that a litre of diesel yields 4.5 Kms mileage. Similarly, a
tyre is assumed to need retreading or replacement at the end of a run of
17,500 Kms showing the quantity per Km. of 0.000057142. For wages
and salaries, the assumption made is that the bus needs four crew to run
250 Kms a day: 4 divided by 250 yields a unit quantity of 0.016. For
tax, depreciation etc the denominator is taken as 82,500 Kms a year
(250 Kms a day for 330 days in a year).  The unit quantities were multiplied
by the current price to arrive at the price index. The index value for
1996 was taken as the base year (9.821=100, not shown in Table 1)
(NATPAC, 2010b).
There are two steps from PISCO index to the computation of
passenger fare per kilometer. The ratio of the current year value of PISCO
to its base year value is the correction factor used for raising the fare.
The fare is computed by dividing the total operating cost per Km plus
return on investment by the average equivalent passenger load factor
(EQLF).The underlying assumption is that the passenger load should
cover all costs and should yield a reasonable rate of return on the
investment. As the student passengers pay only 25% of the general
passenger fare, the equivalent passenger load is the sum of average
11
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general passenger km per trip plus average student km per trip multiplied
by 0.25. The assumption is that the carriage operator should get cost
plus return on investment and if students pay 25% of the fare, then the
other general passengers should compensate by paying more.
As regards minimum fare, NATPAC has the following to say,
"Minimum fare is fixed by applying the basic fare rate to the average
passenger lead distance in city ordinary services or a minimum distance
of say 5-7 Km which will be determined by the Government as part of
their fare policy" (NATPAC, 2010a: p.59). Fixation of minimum fare
higher than the actual fare, it is said, is a convention followed in the
state to "compensate for the losses due to giving concessional tickets to
students by both KSRTC and private operators" (p.59).
The price index found its application for revising the fares in
1999 in Kerala. The passenger fare per kilometer was revised from 22
paise in 1996 to 28 paise in 1999 for ordinary/ city/ mofussil/ town
services. The PISCO was updated in 2001 and the fare revised to 35
paise per Km from 1 October 2001. The next revision of PISCO was
carried out in November 2003 and the fare revision occurred in August
2004; the revision of the fare being from 35 paise to 42 paise per Km.
The next revision of the fare from 42 to 48 paise was effected in November
2005.  Thus, the successive fare revisions since 1999 were based on the
raise in the PISCO index.
In the meanwhile the PISCO index came under severe attack on
account of the unduly large weight attached to the spares and
maintenance component. While changing the base of PISCO from 1996
to 2005 the weights of spares and maintenance, crew wages, tax,
insurance and depreciation were changed to make them more realistic
(Table 1). Under the spares and maintenance, for instance, the weight of
diesel engine changed from 0.4x10-5 to 1.74x10-6 and that of clutch
plates from 0.1667x10-4 to 1.30788x10-5. As regards wages and salaries,
the weights changed from 0.016 to 0.012848 for wages and from 0.016
13
to 0.034915 for gratuity. For tax and cost of capital, the weights changed
from 0.1212x10-4 to 9.96198x10-6. The changes in weights for wages,
tax, insurance etc came about because the kilometers run per bus in a
year, which was assumed to be 82,500 in the 1996 year base index
changed to 100,000 a year in 2005.
The 2005- base PISCO was used for the fare revision in 2008, the
revision being from 48 paise to 55 paise per Km. As the price of diesel
was reduced in February 2009 the value of PISCO index dropped by a
few points and the fare was reduced to 52 paise. It was again increased in
February 2010 to the level prevailing in 2008 following the 7% increase
in the value of PISCO in February 2010 compared to the 2009 level.
Overall, the use of PISCO for revising the passenger fares of the
stage carriages involves the following assumptions which have
significant policy implications. Minimum fare is only the fare for the
average lead distance in city ordinary services and it has no other
economic significance. All the cost components including the crew
wages, tax and interest are converted into per Km cost using an average
run per day of 250 Kms initially (till 2005) and 300 Kms later. Per Km
cost is translated into passenger fare by taking an average equivalent
passenger load factor which builds cross subsidization into the formula
leaving space for hardly any policy initiative.
4. PISCO related Profitability Factors
Part of the reason for the poor profitability of a large segment of
the private stage carriage operators in Kerala is the PISCO and the fare
computation method followed in the state. There are four or five specific
ways PISCO affects the profitability: the use of average kilometers (250
till 2005 and 300 later) in converting the cost components into unit
quantities in the index; converting crew wages, tax, insurance etc., into
unit quantities as if they are variable cost components; using average
EQLF for translating per kilometer cost into passenger fare; and building
14
student concession into the EQLF. This section seeks to elaborate these
problems with examples.
Among the cost components shown in Table 1, high speed diesel,
lubricants, tyre and tube, spare and maintenance vary with the kilometers
run and are truly variable in nature. The more the kilometers run higher
the total expenditure and it varies directly with the kilometers run. In
other words the unit cost is constant. As regards the rest of the cost
components, namely crew wages, tax, insurance and depreciation, the
expenditure does not vary with the kilometers run a day (of course,
within certain limits) - and that is exactly the reason they are called
fixed cost- and the more the number of kilometers run a day the cost per
Km becomes smaller as the fixed cost gets distributed over larger number
of Kms. Under such conditions, when the average is taken to compute
unit quantities those running below the average do not recover the
fixed costs and those running above the average make supra profits,
other conditions remaining the same.
Let us take the computations shown in Table 4.2 of NATPAC
2010a. It is shown that the total variable cost is Rs. 13.432 per Km and
the fixed cost Rs 9.5912 per Km (taking a run of 300 Kms a day). The
operator has to recover Rs 2877 a day to cover the full fixed cost including
a reasonable return on capital; the variable costs are covered irrespective
of the Kms run as they vary proportionately with the Kms run. The
operator recovers the full fixed cost if the bus runs for 300 Kms a day. If
the Kms run is only 200 a day, then the recovery is Rs 1918 and there
would be a shortfall of Rs 959 a day. At the same time an operator who
runs the bus for 400 Kms a day makes an extra profit of Rs 959 a day.
There is no solution to this problem as long as the PISCO index is being
applied for determining the passenger fares.
How seriously does the problem of average kilometers affect the
profitability of PSCs? The current PISCO based fare fixation formula is
inherently disadvantageous to private operators and advantageous to
15
KSRTC. In KSRTC, over two-thirds the number of all their services run
for over 300 Kms  a day whereas in the private sector 100% of their
services run for less than 310 Kms. Over 50% of the services of private
operators run less than 265 Kms a day: "Buses were operated between
220 Kms to (sic) 310 Kms daily … On an average they operated 263
Kms daily and 85876 Kms annually" (NATPAC, 2010a, p.12). Under the
current fare structure almost all the private operators will run a deficit on
their fixed capital account as hardly any one runs for over 300 Kms a
day. A recent sample survey of the  PSCs in Ernakulam showed that only
12% of all the buses in the district run for over 300 Kms a day. About
12% of the buses run for less than 200 Kms a day incurring a deficit on
fixed cost of over Rs 959 a day. About 40% of the buses run on an
average about 230 Kms a day incurring a deficit of about Rs 670 a day.
Thus, the problem is serious and a solution to this conundrum cannot be
found in the current formula.
Turning to the issue of minimum fare, the logic of its determination
explained in the NATPAC Report is full of contradictions. It is not clear
why the minimum fare should be fixed by applying the basic fare to the
average passenger lead distance in city ordinary services? What has city
ordinary services to do with the economics of mofussil services, or the
profitability of stage carriages elsewhere? Why was the convention of
fixing minimum fare higher than the actual fare introduced? If a
convention does not make economic sense, then don't we have to do
away with it? How did the question of minimum fare compensating
losses due to giving concessional tickets to students arise? Where is the
loss when in the first place the equivalent passenger load factor is used?
The cost of operation per Km is translated into passenger fare per
Km by dividing the former by an average passenger load which takes
the average student Km per trip of 6.29 and average general passenger
Km per trip of 34.23. Since students avail 75% ticket concession and
pay only 25% of the general fare, the Equivalent Passenger Load Factor
16
is taken as 35.8 (34.23 + 6.29x0.25). The problem with the average
passenger load factor is that the average is influenced by large extreme
values and often a large proportion of values at the lower end fall below
the average. The large proportion of buses carrying passengers below
the average will not be able to recover their capital cost. The problem
worsens if the average load factor is low for those buses which run below
average number of Kms a day. We illustrate the problem by taking the
results of a recent survey of stage carriages operating in Ernakulam. The
average number of passengers a day for a sample of 64 buses is 1145.48.
But about 48% of the buses carry a passenger load below the average.
They would not be able to cover their fixed costs. Almost all of them run
less than 300 Kms a day leading to a double burden: the burden of lower
Kms as well as lower passenger load. Of course, one could argue that
those running less than 300 Kms a day might have a passenger load
above average to compensate the lower daily run. But the Ernakulam
survey shows that only about 25% of those running below 300 Kms a
day get a passenger load above average. Thus, the double burden cannot
easily be ignored.
The method adopted for converting per kilometer cost into
passenger fare is by using the weighted load factor. In the current context
when the average Student Passenger km per trip is 6.29 and the General
Passenger km per trip is 34.23 (Total Passenger km per trip of apprx. 41)
full fare is collected from only 35.8 Equivalent Passenger Load
Factor(34.23 + 0.25x6.29).  In essence this would mean the General
Passengers have been paying about 13% more to compensate the
concessional fare of 25% of the prescribed general fare paid by the
students. As the travelling public are mostly from the lower income
groups- higher income groups have other modes of transport claiming
more road space!- the better off in the society do not pay for the sustenance
of the public transport industry in the state (see Section 6 for details).
The reasonable returns on investment are assured by cross subsidizing
the student fare by the non student passengers and not the general public.
17
The student fares have been frozen since 2001. The concessional
fare, which was 25% of the prescribed general passenger fare between
1994 and 2001, became an even smaller proportion of the general
passenger fare (Table 2). Currently, the per kilometer student fare is only
about 15% of the general passenger fare and the minimum student fare
is only about 12.50% of the minimum fare for the general public. The
freezing of the concession fare and applying the weight of 0.25 in the
formula of EQLF has meant that the general passengers continue to pay
about 13% higher fare to compensate the loss on account of student
concessions. The actual loss is slightly higher as the realization from
the student travelers is only about 15% of the general fare as against the
assumed 25%. This component of the loss is borne by the bus owners.
Table 2.  Impact of Student Concessions on General Fare
Year Student Fare as a % of Impact of Concession
General Passenger Fare  on Passenger and Fare
 Loadings
Per Km. Fare Minimum EQLF Fare
Fare  Loading
2001 25 25 35.8 13.18
2004 - 20
2005 18.23 16.67 35.38 14.53
2008 15.91 12.50 35.23 15.02
2009 16.83 14.29
2010 15.91 12.50 35.23 15.02
2011* 14.34 12.50 35.13 15.34
Note: * arrived at by taking a 10% increase in passenger fare. EQLF-
equivalent passenger load factor = number of general passenger
+ (student fare proportion x number of student travellers); Fare
loading is the proportion by which general passenger fares are
raised to compensate for the loss on account of student
concession.
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In effect, the loss for the operators is higher as the last ten years
have seen other categories of travellers being offered concessions, such
as the physically handicapped, deaf and dumb and the mentally retarded.
There is some estimate of these numbers by the KSRTC, which needs to
be scrutinized; but the number of such concessional passengers other
than students does not enter the Equivalent Passenger Load Factor.
The average student load used in the EQLF is about 15% of the
total passenger load and like all averages this too would affect the
profitability of the PSCs favourably or unfavourably depending on
whether the students' share in the total passengers is lower or higher
than the average. The problem would be serious depending on the
variation in the students' share around the average. In the survey of
PSCs carried out in Ernakulam district, about 31% of all services showed
students' share to be above 15%. The problem would be mitigated to
some extent if these services carried above the average number of total
passengers. Unfortunately, about 17% of all services carried below the
average number of total passengers and above the average share of
students thus bearing a double burden. A further layer of burden is
added by the kilometers run a day. About 80% of the services carrying
above average share of students in total passengers also run for less than
300 Kilometers a day. These are important factors in the profitability
and sustainability of the PSCs.
In sum, the major problem with the PISCO index and the method
of computing passenger fare is that some of the basic economic principles
have not entered it in any systematic way. The government too has not
issued any policy guidelines to give direction to the method of
computation. For instance, there is hardly any policy direction as to
who should bear the burden of concessions to a whole class of passengers.
An index not informed by policy guidelines or economic principles has
played havoc with the profitability of an industry characterized by wide
variation in the number of kilometers run a day, the number of total
19
passengers carried and the share of concessional passengers in the total
and so on.
5. Some Options in Fare Fixation
How do we solve the problem of full cost recovery of fixed cost of
private stage carriages in Kerala drawing on the economic thinking that
has gone into the issue over the last 100 years or so (Section 2 above)?
Given the structure of the transport sector in the state, dominated by
private stage carriages largely owned in ones or twos by individuals,
subsidy, institutional monopoly and advanced revenue with capital
adjustments on a general scale are ruled out. However, each of them
might be relevant and could have applications as we show below. That
takes us to a consideration of two-part tariff, separating access fee and
usage fee, linking the former with the number of users and the latter with
the distance travelled by the passengers.
Minimum fare is computed so as to cover the fixed costs incurred
in running the stage carriage services. These expenses are incurred to
bring the bus on road as a stage carriage and include salary of staff,
insurance, tax and capital costs including reasonable return on capital.
These costs need to be shared by all passengers using the services and
cannot be tagged to the kilometers run for the reasons already gone into
in Section 3 above. Fixed costs- not just those listed in Table 1, we
include wages and salaries, tax, insurance, cost of capital and
depreciation under this head- per day as computed by different
organizations are as follows: Rs 3235 (All Kerala Bus Operators
Organisation- AKBOO), Rs 2635 (Kerala State Private Bus Operators
Federation-KSPBOF), Rs 2907 (PISCO). This cost has to be shared by
all the passengers on an equal basis. Then the information on total
number of passengers travelling a day can be used to arrive at minimum
fare as shown in Table 3.
An overall average number of passengers travelling a day cannot
be taken for the computation of the minimum fare for the reasons already
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elaborated in the earlier sections, namely that over 50% of the buses
will be carrying passengers below the average and will not cover their
costs. The Ernakulam survey suggests that only 5 out of 64 stage carriages
carried less than 800 passengers a day. Hence, if we take 800 as the
denominator for computing the minimum fare it would address the full
fixed cost recovery of almost all private stage carriages. The small
proportion that is disadvantaged- if for reasons beyond their control-
may be compensated in other ways as elaborated below. The data
available from KSRTC too suggests that 805 is the average daily
passengers carried per bus in the three depots- Neyyattinkara, Kollam
and Thiruvanthapuram- totaling 279 buses. In the case of KSRTC,
average can be used as the problem of distribution among buses running
varying kilometers or carrying varying passenger load does not arise.
The fare shown in Table 3 cannot be taken as minimum fare as any
passenger entering a bus travels a certain distance, at least the first stage
of up to 2.5 Kms, the fare for which also needs to be included in the
minimum fare.  At the current diesel prices and spare and maintenance
charges the variable cost per Km, taking all the cost components in
Table 1 not included in fixed cost as defined in the previous paragraph,
would be Rs 14.05, which translates into a passenger fare per Km of 31
paise at a passenger load of 45. The minimum fare would, then, be what
is shown in Table 3 plus 78 paise. Thus, whether we take the AKBOO
cost or PISCO cost minimum fare of Rs 5 (4.04 +0.78 or 3.63+0.78)
would fully recover the fixed costs of operation of private stage carriages.
As the minimum fare is the fare for Stage I (upto 2.5 Kms), the fare
for each of the higher stages would increase by one rupee that is the fare
for each stage of 2.5 Kms, as shown in Table 4. The one rupee increase
for each stage leaves enough margins for about 25% increase in fuel
costs in the months to come. In other words, another hike in per kilometer
fare would become necessary only after a 25% increase in diesel price
from its current level. Such a buffer is needed as the fare increase often
takes place only many months after the hike in fuel prices.
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It may not be the case that all the 8% of the buses who carry less
than 800 passengers a day do not fully recover the fixed costs. Some of
them might not be incurring the total amounts of fixed costs as listed
above for the simple reason that their seating capacity is less than what
is taken as the standard. The information provided by a sample of private
stage carriage operators in their quarterly returns as per Rule 158 MV
Act suggests that over 50% of the buses have a capacity (sitting plus
standing) less than 44, and a quarter of all less than 33. Fixed costs in
such cases are less. Private stage carriage operators have the option of
plying smaller buses in routes with lesser number of passengers.
Another option recommended for consideration is the night and
early morning services with enhanced fare structure. It is generally seen
that PSCs are averse to run services during early hours and late evenings,
which could be owing to poor revenue collection. An enhanced rate
structure might partly solve this problem as with less number of
passengers the collection could be higher. The available information on
other modes of travel used by passengers, number of services curtailed
owing to poor custom, the increased traffic etc are too scanty to arrive at
an informed rate structure. All that can be attempted is to begin
something on an experimental basis and wait for the response of the
travelling public and service providers. Such an experiment could be
on the lines of 25% higher fare on all ordinary services beginning 8PM
and ending 6AM.
There are two important implications of fixing minimum fare to
cover fixed costs:
(i) Once fixed costs are removed from the per kilometer rate and
hence passenger fare per kilometer, it is much simpler to relate
diesel price hike to passenger fare as over 70% of the variable
costs are accounted for by the fuel cost. Then a 10% increase in
fuel price will be compensated by a 7% increase in the passenger
fare with the minimum fare unaffected. The share of fuel cost in
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total variable cost is bound to go up as the diesel pricing system
moves away from the administered price system and it is important
to move towards a simpler system of kilometer fare fixation
without waiting for the recommendations of a committee.
(ii) Minimum fares affect the revenue of the city and mofusil services
more than the longer routes. It is seen that around two-thirds of
all the passengers in the city services travel up to 5 Kms or first
two fare stages, whereas the share of the first two fare stages is
less than 25% in longer routes and around 50% in mofusil routes.
Consequent to such predominance of short distance passengers
in city services it is often sensible to keep the minimum fare low
to encourage more travelers in that category; or to get people
shift away from private modes of transport, such as auto rickshaws
for better traffic management and reduce congestion. Various
policy instruments are available to achieve this goal: capital
subsidy by the local governments (the argument of the JNNURM
for the Municipal Corporations to share 10% of the capital cost)
is one such. Similarly, if a particular local body wishes to subsidise
students from the locality or workers commuting, then it could
consider capital subsidy, or pay the vehicle tax in return for a
reduction in the minimum fare in that route (See Appendix I for
detailed computation).
6. Student Concession and Passenger Fare
Concessional fare for students in public transport serves a social
purpose by providing physical access to education to a whole class of
students. As the burden of the subsidy cannot be borne by the PSCs
lest cost recovery is affected, it has to be borne either by the government
or the travelling public. Kerala has gone for cross subsidization by
using EQLF in the fair fixation formula. By its very nature any system
of cross subsidization leads to income redistribution with welfare
implications.
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In order to understand the income redistribution effect of cross
subsidization it is necessary to characterize the population dependent
on public transport in Kerala. When the concessional student fare was
introduced in 1963 the travelling public was almost entirely dependent
on public transport with few private vehicles on the roads of Kerala. In
1965-66, in Kerala for every one stage carriage there were only about
four private cars and one motor cycle. Thus, the travelling public which
cross subsidized the student fare was more or less the same as that which
benefited from the subsidy with little scope for redistribution. More or
less the same picture existed even in the early 1990s. In 1990, for every
one stage carriage there were only about eight private cars, 16 motor
cycles/ scooters and about four auto-rickshaws in Kerala. By 2009, the
proportions have changed drastically: for every stage carriage there
were about 51 private cars, 195 motor cycles/ scooters and 28 auto-
rickshaws. It may be inferred that a sizeable proportion of the adult
population from among the middle and upper income groups who were
earlier dependent on public transport is no more dependent on it.
However, the poorer segments of the population continue to be dependent
on public transport. Their use of public transport must have increased
with the increase in the level of urbanization and shift to more service
sector employment. As a sizeable proportion of students belonging to
the non- poor groups use public transport, the poorer segments of the
adult population who use public transport may be paying for their
travel.
How much more do the general passengers pay to cross subsidise
student concessions? The minimum fare for students, which was set at
Re 0.50 in 2001, has not been revised for over 10 years. It is a big drain
on the shorter routes as the number of students traveling in the first two
fare stages would almost equal the number of general passengers in a
number of routes. When minimum fare is set to cover the fixed costs as
shown in Table 3, the student concession causes the general fare to go
up by over 15%. Taking the average number of passengers travelling in
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a day to be 800 and the student share to be 15%, at the current concession
fares the minimum fare would go up by 15%, that is 3.63 to 4.19.
There are two major implications of the current Kerala Pricing
Model:
(i) As the EQLF is arrived at by weighing concessional passengers
at 0.25 of the adult general passengers, the burden of full recovery
of the cost of running the bus falls on the general passengers who
pay fares about 15% higher. The general travelling public by
paying higher fare subsidise the concessional passengers; the
bus owners or KSRTC do not bear the burden. This is most
iniquitous, as such burden, often called social cost or social
responsibility, should be borne by the society at large and not
the poorer segment of the population who have to depend on
public transport. The richer segment of the population owning
private transport vehicles not only use more of road space and
cause more pollution, but also do not bear the social
responsibility!
(ii) The use of EQLF to translate the per kilometer cost into passenger
fare leads to inequity among the stage carriage operators. Those
buses carrying the passenger load in accordance with the EQLF
would meet the cost and make a normal profit. Those who carry
below the EQLF of 35.8 would make a loss and those who carry
above the EQLF of 35.8 would make supra profits. One is not
referring to the lower or higher load owing to competition or
nature of the route. An example will clarify this issue. Suppose
two buses A and B both carry 41 passengers. Suppose bus A
carries 30 general passengers and 11 students (EQLF of 32.75)
and bus B carries 39 general passengers and 2 students (EQLF of
39.5). Both the buses carry the same number of passengers but
bus A would make a loss of 10% and B would make a supra gain
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of 10%. The problem is greatly minimized when stage carriages
are operated by fleet owners (such as KSRTC). The formula such
as EQLF does not allow for transfer from gainers to losers to
equalize earnings of stage carriage operators.
It is imperative to do away with EQLF and use the passenger load
factor to convert the kilometer rate into passenger kilometer fare. This in
essence is moving away from cross subsidization to tax financing of
student fare subsidy. Such a move will eliminate both the issues raised
above,  namely (i) and (ii), general passengers subsidizing the concession
fare of the students and some bus owners gaining and others losing on
account of carrying different proportion of the total load as concession
load. However, this solution would lead to two new issues: (i) how
should the student concession be implemented? and (ii) what should be
the system of reimbursement?
There are a few well known methods which could be adopted in
the implementation of the student concession scheme:
(i) One of them could be to issue vouchers to all eligible students
who will have to present them to the bus conductor during travel.
The bus conductors present the aggregates of these vouchers to
designated offices of the government to collect the equivalent
cash. The Department of the Government which finances the
scheme will have to make the cash available. The advantage for
the students is that they could travel with dignity in any bus
running in the route concerned. The disadvantage of such a
scheme would be that it is administration intensive as the
vouchers will have to be distributed in the first instance, collected
by the conductors and then again to be presented, verified and
reimbursed. The cost of administration could be very high and
further that there could be scope for manipulation.
(ii) An alternative could be a web-based registration of all eligible
students with the stage of travel and the bus entered at the time of
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registration. An identity card could be issued to the students
with these details and it would be obligatory for the bus specified
in the card to carry the students. The students cannot avail the
concession in any other bus. The amount to be reimbursed can
automatically be arrived at on the basis of the information
available on the registration site. Reimbursement could also be
carried out using electronic clearing system once the specified
bus enters a bank account number on the site.
System (ii) could be extended to all other classes of concession
travelers. The advantage of (ii) above is that at any point of time
information on the number of students or others availing concession,
the amount being reimbursed under each head etc., will readily be
available.
7. Conclusions
The practice of combining fixed and variable costs to arrive at a
per kilometer running cost taking an average daily kilometer run of
stage carriages adversely affects their sustainability. The average
equivalent load factor adds a new dimension pushing certain segments
of PSCs further in the direction of a slide. The EQLF also introduces
serious inequities placing the whole burden of concessional travel on
the shoulders (pockets?) of the poorer travelling public. It is time a
serious rethinking is done on these issues.
The system of two-part tariffs discussed here would go a long way
in simplifying the system of fare fixation in Kerala. Relating minimum
fare to the fixed costs of operation opens the gates for the local
governments to participate in their traffic management. As shown in
Appendix I, sharing part of the fixed costs by the local governments
would lead to a substantial fall in the minimum fare taking traffic away
from auto-rickshaws, motor cycles and cars reducing vehicle density
considerably. It would be worth trying it on an experimental basis in
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Thiruvananthapuram Corporation area for a few months. It is time the
local governments also become part of the traffic management systems
rather than putting the entire onus on the traffic police.
Instituting a system of public subsidies for student/ concessional
travel would go a long way in dispelling the general feeling that carrying
them leads to a loss, which in fact is not the case owing to EQLF. They
would be treated with dignity once it is accepted that they too pay full
fare, although indirectly. It would also provide a clear picture about the
magnitude of the subsidy flowing into different groups of concession
holders.
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Appendix  I
Minimum Fare under Various Cost Scenarios
For ease of illustration of the minimum fare under various cost
scenarios, we take the fixed cost per day with amounts (in Rupees) fairly
close to reality (See Section 4, the NATPAC figure is Rs 2907) but
rounded off to multiples of 800, or fraction of it as follows:
Salary 1600
Insurance 100
Vehicle Tax 300
Profit 500
Depreciation 300
Overhead 200
Total 3000
1. No Subsidy (Current Scenario): Fixed Cost per Day, Rs 3000
Minimum Fare (Fixed Cost component) = 3000/800 = 3.75
Minimum Fare (FC component + I Stage Km Cost) = 3.75 + 1.00
= 4.75 rounded of to 5.00
2. under Capital Subsidy: Fixed Cost per Day, Rs 3000 - 500 - 300
= 2200
Minimum Fare (Fixed Cost component) = 2200/800 =2.75
Minimum Fare (FC component + I Stage Km Cost) = 2.75 + 1.00
= 3.75 rounded of to 4.00
3. Under Capital Subsidy, insurance and Vehicle Tax Subsidy:  Fixed
Cost per Day, Rs 3000 - 500 - 300 -100- 300 = 1800
Minimum Fare (Fixed Cost component) = 1600/800 = 2.00
Minimum Fare (FC component +  I Stage Km Cost)  =  2.00 + 1.00 = 3.00
The implications of capital subsidy are interesting to work out. If
the Municipal Corporation of Thiruvananthapurm decides to implement
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subsidy under Scenario 3, then it would incur an expenditure of about
Rs 5 crores per year on the 110 buses. The maximum fare for a 10
kilometer travel would then be just Rs 6 and most of the travelling
public would travel by bus. Autorickshaws, cars and motor cycles would
come out less and traffic management would ease greatly and so too
vehicular pollution.
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